Integration and Conditional Convergence in the Enlarged EU Area. CEPS ENEPRI Working Papers No. 31, 1 February 2005 by Kaitila, Ville.
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels • Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 • Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 • VAT: BE 424.123.986 
e-mail: info@enepri.org • website: http://www.enepri.org 
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTES 
WORKING PAPER NO. 31/FEBRUARY 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTEGRATION AND CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE  
IN THE ENLARGED EU AREA 
VILLE KAITILA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 92-9079-551-4 
AVAILABLE FOR FREE DOWNLOADING FROM THE ENEPRI WEBSITE (HTTP://WWW.ENEPRI.ORG) 
OR THE CEPS WEBSITE (WWW.CEPS.BE)  
© COPYRIGHT 2005, VILLE KAITILA 
  
Integration and Conditional Convergence  
in the Enlarged EU Area 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 31/February 2005 
Ville Kaitila
* 
Abstract 
This working paper analyses conditional convergence in Europe and also tries to assess the impact 
that arises from integration. Using a pooled mean-group estimation method, we first analyse the 
conditional convergence of GDP per labour force in the area covering the 15 member states of the 
European Union (EU-15) in 1960-2002. Conditional convergence is well-documented for the EU-
15. Higher investment, lower public consumption and lower inflation have contributed positively 
to GDP growth. Deeper European integration is shown to have accelerated growth when inflation 
is not included in the specification, but not otherwise. The evidence on the effect of integration on 
growth is therefore mixed. We then apply the same method to estimate the growth of GDP per 
labour force in the new EU member states – the eight Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) – for the period 1993-2002. These countries are shown to have converged conditionally 
towards the average level of GDP per labour force in the EU-15. Higher investment and lower 
public consumption have also supported growth in the CEECs. 
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Integration and Conditional Convergence  
in the Enlarged EU Area 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 31/February 2005 
Ville Kaitila 
Introduction 
Integration has decreased barriers to trade and cross-border investment in Europe. This result has, 
among other things, made business and product standards and administrative practices more 
similar. As a result, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have increased between the 
countries participating in integration. FDI has often been trade-supporting with intra-industry 
trade especially increasing. FDI inflows also help to modernise technology and business practices 
in less advanced economies. 
Consequently, European integration should push the continent towards fewer differences in 
productivity as well as in wage and price levels. By and large, convergence in GDP per capita has 
indeed taken place within the area of the 15 member states of the European Union (EU-15) since 
1960. Still, convergence has not been uniform and periodic divergence has also occurred.
1 
Using pooled mean-group estimation we first analyse conditional β-convergence of GDP per 
labour force in constant 1995 PPP-adjusted US dollars – the measurement we henceforth use – in 
the EU-15 area in 1960-2002. Then we apply the same method to estimate the conditional 
convergence of the new EU member states – the eight Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs)
2 – towards the average of the EU-15 countries in 1993-2002. We focus on the effects 
arising from investment, EU membership and deeper integration, foreign trade, inflation and 
public consumption. 
Conditional (β-)convergence refers to a situation where there is a negative relationship between 
the initial level of GDP per labour force and its average growth rate after we control for additional 
variables such as investment. In other words, poorer countries have a tendency to grow faster than 
richer ones and will eventually tend to catch up with them. 
Our results indicate that conditional convergence has indeed occurred in the EU-15 area in 1960-
2002. Higher investment, lower public consumption and lower inflation have contributed 
positively to GDP growth. Deeper European integration is shown to have accelerated growth 
when inflation is not included in the specification, but not otherwise. The evidence on the effect 
of integration on growth is therefore mixed.  
Furthermore, the CEECs are shown to have converged conditionally towards the EU-15 countries’ 
average level of GDP per labour force in the EU-15 in 1993-2002. Higher investment and lower 
public consumption have supported growth in the CEECs. 
In absolute terms, the CEECs are presently at about the same level of GDP per labour force as the 
EU-15 countries were in the mid-1960s. The Baltic countries and Poland have lower productivity 
than the other CEECs. Figure 1 shows unconditional convergence in the enlarged EU area after 
1960. For the EU-15 countries, we show GDP per labour force in 1960 and its average growth rate 
in the 1960-73 period of fast growth and the total time period 1960-2002. For clarity, only the 
linear trend has been shown, not the position of individual countries. For the CEECs we show 
                                                 
1  See for example Kaitila (2004). 
2 The eight CEECs comprise the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. We do not include Cyprus or Malta in the analysis. 2 | VILLE KAITILA 
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GDP per labour force in 1993 (1994 for Lithuania) and growth rates up to 2002. The position of 
individual CEECs is also shown. In all three cases there is a negative relationship between the 
initial level of GDP per labour force and its growth rate. Consequently, unconditional 
convergence has indeed taken place in Europe. The R
2 values are presented in the graph, which 
are relatively high. 
Figure 1. Real GDP (PPP) per labour force of EU-15 countries in 1960 with average growth 
rates in 1960-73 and 1960-2002, and the CEECs’ GDP (PPP) per labour force in 
1993-94 with average growth rates up to 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Real GDP (PPP) per labour force has been growing since at least 1993 in the CEECs (1994 in 
Lithuania). Belgium and Luxembourg are combined. 
Comparing the EU-15 countries during the whole available time period 1960-2002 and the CEECs 
since 1993-94, we find that the latter have grown faster than the former given their initial levels of 
GDP per labour force: the linear trend is positioned higher in the case of the CEECs. 
Why is there such a difference in the trends? The main reason is simply ‘catching up’, as GDP per 
labour force in the CEECs was and remains considerably lower than in the EU-15. Despite faster 
growth, it is not self-evident that poorer countries will grow faster than wealthier ones. For 
example, the Czech Republic has by and large failed to do so. 
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The EU has given the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe a clear direction of 
reform in legislation, politics, economics and administration. The speed of structural change and 
the large inflows of FDI, which have introduced more modern technology and business practices, 
have fostered an environment that has promoted investment and growth. In this sense, the CEECs 
that joined the EU in 2004 have been in a better position than the countries of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States to their east, which are not candidates for EU membership (see also Crafts 
& Kaiser, 2004). The EU-15 also forms a very large and wealthy destination for exports from the 
CEECs. 
On the other hand, Figure 1 also shows the growth performance of the EU-15 countries during 
1960-73. It is notable that at that time the EU-15 countries were growing faster than the CEECs 
have done since 1993-94 (the linear trend is higher in the case of the former). Consequently, the 
performance of the CEECs has not been spectacular from a historical European point of view. 
During the past couple of decades, growth rates have declined in the EU-15, which explains why 
the linear trend for the CEECs is higher than for the EU-15 countries in 1960-2002 despite the 
brisk performance of the latter before the first oil crisis. 
1.  Trade, integration and growth: Earlier results 
Before going into the model we estimate, it is useful to discuss some earlier results concerning the 
impact of trade on growth, given that economic integration increases trade and European 
integration has an important role in our analysis. 
According to Ben-David & Rahman (1996), countries that trade extensively tend to converge 
more than countries that do not have the same intensity of trade. Ben-David & Kimhi (2000) 
provide evidence that increased exports, especially from poorer countries to wealthier ones, are 
related to an increase in the rate of income convergence between them. They also argue that prior 
to trade policy liberalisation in Europe there was very little change in trade-to-GDP ratios. After 
liberalisation, a significant increase in trade occurred, which tended to level off and remain at the 
new higher level at the end of liberalisation. 
Edwards (1998) finds evidence of a positive effect from openness on total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth. But he uses nine different openness indicators that are for the most part only 
available for a part of the 1980s. The indices used are measurements of tariffs, quotas, etc. TFP 
growth is assumed to arise from two sources: domestic (innovation) and international (the ability 
to adopt and use foreign innovations). The former is a function of the level of human capital while 
the latter is assumed to be a function of a catching-up period that is longer the poorer the country 
is. More open and less developed countries rely more on the international channel for TFP growth 
than other countries. Yet the ability to adopt foreign innovations also depends on the quality of 
human capital. 
According to Rodríguez & Rodrik (1999), empirical studies that conclude that a more liberal trade 
regime induces faster GDP growth are problematic, in that the indicators used to measure 
openness are poor measures of trade barriers or they are highly correlated with other sources of 
poor economic performance, notably macroeconomic imbalances. 
Nevertheless, Wacziarg & Welch (2003) argue that dates showing the liberalisation of the trade 
regime can be used to estimate the within-country growth response. In the countries that have 
liberalised their trade regimes after 1950, GDP growth rates have risen by an average of 1.5 
percentage points compared with the pre-liberalisation period. The investment-to-GDP ratio also 
increased by 1.5 to 2 percentage points. Furthermore, liberalisation raised the trade-to-GDP ratio 
by an average of 5 percentage points after controlling for a time trend. 
Concerning European integration, Ben-David (1993) argues that the liberalisation of trade 
between the six original European Economic Community (EEC) countries led to income 
convergence. The timing of trade reform between the EEC and European Free Trade area (EFTA) 4 | VILLE KAITILA 
countries was also found to coincide closely with convergence.
3 The analysis does not take into 
account the countries’ trade-to-GDP ratios, which are likely to have an impact on convergence. 
Using Ben-David’s (1996) method, Gaulier (2003) argues that trade intensity does not in itself 
lead to σ-convergence. Still, he does find evidence that trade and β-convergence are robustly 
linked. 
Henrekson et al. (1996) analyse the growth effects of European integration. They conclude that 
European Community (EC) or EFTA membership may have had a positive effect of up to 1 
percentage point in the growth rate of the member countries. They do not find any difference 
between membership in the EC or the EFTA. They argue that technology transfer is the main 
channel through which membership has affected growth, but that membership has had no effect on 
investment. 
Baldwin & Seghezza (1996) argue that countries that were members of the European Community 
during 1971-90 experienced faster TFP growth than other European countries, such as those that 
were part of the EFTA. Furthermore, the founding members of the EEC had experienced the 
highest growth rates. Baldwin & Seghezza also argue that European integration affects growth 
through physical capital formation (integration-induced, investment-led growth) and knowledge 
creation (integration-induced, technology-led growth). They further argue that the convergence of 
Ireland, Spain and Portugal is proof of the former, while it is very difficult to measure the latter. 
Wagner & Hlouskova (2002) base their analysis on the historical convergence of the EU countries 
and then project it on the accession countries by analysing data going up to 1998. They argue that 
the neo-classical growth model “does not yet adequately describe the growth process” in the 
CEECs. 
2. The  model 
In the standard neo-classical growth model, economic growth is driven by technological progress 
and the accumulation of two factors of production, namely labour and capital. Technological 
progress is assumed to be exogenous, but sustained growth in per-capita incomes cannot occur 
without it. Labour is determined by population, which is assumed to be growing at an exogenous 
rate. The investment rate is typically assumed to be constant, determined by a constant saving 
rate. Consequently, output, investment and the capital stock will all grow by the same long-run 
growth rate. 
Convergence occurs because of capital investment flows to less capital-abundant countries and 
sectors – where returns on investment are higher – thereby raising productivity. Another 
possibility is that labour migrates to more developed countries, where wages are higher. Per capita 
income in a given country converges to that country’s steady-state value. Also, if countries are 
similar in every respect other than their initial capital stocks, poorer countries will grow faster 
than wealthier ones. 
If we control for the determinants of the steady state, the results are ‘conditional convergence’ 
(see for example Mankiw et al., 1992), i.e. a relation between the growth rate and the initial 
conditions after controlling for some other variables. According to the conditional convergence 
hypothesis, if countries have access to the same technology and their population growth rates are 
the same, but they have different propensities to save and their initial capital-to-labour ratios are 
different, there is still convergence towards the same growth rate of output and capital, but at a 
different steady-state income level. 
We construct a neo-classical aggregate growth model following Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001). 
They analyse economic growth and the role of technological progress, policy and institutions in 
21 OECD countries in 1971-98 in the tradition of Solow (1956) and Mankiw et al. (1992). 
                                                 
3 See also Ben-David (1996) for an analysis of several trade regimes and similar results of a positive effect from 
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Bassanini & Scarpetta find that the accumulation of physical and human capital was the main 
growth engines of GDP per capita (for population aged 15-64) in the OECD countries in 1971-98. 
Furthermore, research and development, a sound macroeconomic environment, openness to trade 
and well-developed financial markets contributed to rising living standards. 
We start with a Cobb-Douglas production function with country indices i and time t: 
  ()
1
it it it it YK A L
α α − = ,   (1) 
where Y is output, K is physical capital, A is the level of labour-augmented technology, L is labour 
and 01 α <<  is the constant partial elasticity of output with respect to physical capital.  
Now we define  = it it it it kK A L  as the stock of physical capital per unit of effective labour and 
= it it it it y YA L  as output per unit of effective labour in country i. We can then derive the 
following differential equation: 
  ()
it
ii t i i i t
dk
sy g n dk
dt
=− + +,   (2) 
where s is the investment-to-GDP ratio, g is the exogenous improvement rate of technology A, n is 
the exogenous growth rate of the labour force and d is the (constant) depreciation rate of physical 
capital. 
The production function can be rewritten in the intensive form: 
 
α = it it y k .   (3) 
The steady-state value of capital intensity  it k
*  can be solved from (2) and (3), so that: 
  ()
αα
=− + +
−−
ii i i ks g n d
* 11
log log log
11
.   (4) 
Then we substitute the steady state  i k
*  into (3) to obtain: 
  ()
α α
αα
=+ + − + +
−−
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*
0 log log( ) log log
11
,   (5) 
which gives us the steady-state level of output per worker. Next, we subtract the lagged dependent 
variable from both sides and modify the equation to derive an empirical specification. 
Assume that  AA V () = , where V represents other, policy-related and institutional variables, 
which we include at this stage. These are public spending, inflation, export openness and dummy 
variables reflecting EU integration among other things. We also add country-specific short-term 
dynamics in first-differences as cyclical components of output growth (see the next section for the 
method used). This yields us the function we estimate below: 
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ε
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3
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   (6) 
where the coefficient b captures short-term dynamics and ε is a country-specific error term. The 
time trend present in equation (5) did not become statistically significant in our estimates, so it is 
not included in equation (6). 
Despite our efforts we were unable to find evidence of human capital affecting growth in 1960-
2002 in the EU-15 area. This may be because the EU-15 countries’ income levels are relatively 6 | VILLE KAITILA 
similar. Consequently, education was left out of the specification. The variable we tested was the 
average number of years of education in the working-age population in different years. 
Not all studies have found evidence of a positive impact from human capital on growth. For 
example, Barro (1991), Mankiw et al.  (1992), Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001) and Miller & 
Upadhyay (2002) have, but Hamilton & Monteagudo (1998) and Benhabib & Spiegel (1994) have 
not. Yet after the latter changed their model so that they used the average level of human capital 
during the whole period (and not its growth rate), they did obtain the result that human capital 
affects growth positively. Islam (1995) derives very different results, both positive and negative, 
as to the significance of human capital depending on the estimation method that he uses. 
3.  Estimation method and data 
We use pooled cross-country time-series data for the 14 EU countries
4 in 1960-2002 and the eight 
CEECs in 1993-2002. The method used (pooled mean-group, as later discussed) explains both 
cross-country differences in growth in the short term as well as the growth performance of each 
country over time. The technique allows for short-term adjustments and convergence speeds to 
vary across countries. It imposes restrictions only on long-run coefficients.
5 
Country-specific effects could be controlled for by using a dynamic fixed-effect estimator, which 
would assume homogeneity in both the dynamics and the long-run equilibrium relationship. 
Consequently, the set of slope coefficients would be identical, but differences in intercepts would 
persist. But imposing identical slope coefficients and allowing only intercepts to vary across 
countries may be problematic if the speed of convergence between the countries were to differ. 
An alternative would be to use a mean-group approach, which would be equivalent to estimating 
separate regressions for each country and calculating their mean. It would assume heterogeneity in 
both the dynamics and the long-run equilibrium relationship. This estimator, however, is likely to 
be inefficient if the number of countries in the sample is small. 
An intermediate choice is a pooled mean-group (PMG) estimator, which allows for heterogeneity 
in the short-term coefficients, but assumes homogeneity in the long term (see Pesaran et al., 
1999). Consequently, the intercepts, the speed of convergence parameter ϕ in (6), the short-run 
adjustment coefficients b and error variances may differ across countries, but homogeneity is 
imposed on the long-run coefficients a, which are identical for all the countries in the sample. 
Following Bassanini & Scarpetta (2001), we adopt PMG. 
We use fixed effects and generalised least squares (GLS) with cross-section residual variances as 
weights allowing for cross-section heteroskedasticity. We use annual data instead of the average 
growth rate over a period of time as is done in many other studies. In order to control for cyclical 
components in the year-to-year variations in output, we include first differences of the steady-
state determinants as short-run regressors. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance will allow variances within a 
cross-section to differ across time. Using fixed effects for the intercept specification and cross-
section weights for weighting also implies that each pool will have an unrestricted intercept and 
that each pool equation is weighted by an estimate of the cross-section residual standard 
deviation. 
 
                                                 
4 Here Belgium and Luxembourg are combined. 
5 Other estimation methods that we could have used include using the original income level as the dependent 
variable and average growth rate over time as the independent variable, or analysing the data in five-year blocks, 
for example, in order to avoid cyclical short-term volatility. INTEGRATION AND CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE ENLARGED EU AREA | 7 
 
We use real GDP figures adjusted for purchasing power. Often GDP is divided by either the total 
population or the number of persons aged 15-64 in the population (as in for example Mankiw et 
al., 1992 and Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001). Instead, we divide GDP by the labour force as this is 
closer to the spirit of the production function than the per-capita measures.
6 
We want to analyse as long a time period as possible in order to investigate possible effects 
arising from EU membership and integration on growth. This objective, however, limits the 
selection of other variables. A time period that starts from the early 1970s would allow for more 
variables, but then we would have 9 of the 14 EU countries in the Union during the whole period 
of the analysis. The fact that we have four non-OECD economies also limits the use of OECD 
data.
7 
In addition to the lagged dependent variable, the right-hand side of the estimated equation 
includes the ratio of total investment to GDP and the growth rate of the labour force. We expect 
the former to have a positive sign and the latter a negative sign. These two are supplemented by 
additional variables. The ratio of public consumption to GDP is a fiscal-policy variable with an 
expected negative sign. There are also two inflation variables: consumer price inflation and its 
three-year centred standard deviation. The latter is a measurement of the volatility of (uncertainty 
over) inflation. We expect both to have a negative sign. We use total exports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP to measure openness and expect it to have a positive sign. 
4.  The dummy variables of integration 
We include dummy variables that should capture some of the effect from integration. These 
variables are dummies for when the country is a member of the European Union, its customs 
union (1968), the internal market (1987), a signatory of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the 
economic and monetary union (1999). See Table 1 for the dummies. These dummies have an 
expected positive sign, i.e. we expect that deeper integration will increase convergence.  
Table 1. Dummy variables used in the analysis 
Country EU  Customs 
Union 
Internal 
Market 
Maastricht 
Treaty 
EMU 
Belgium-Luxembourg  1960 1968  1987  1993  1999 
France 1960  1968  1987  1993  1999 
Germany 1960  1968  1987  1993  1999 
Italy 1960  1968  1987  1993  1999 
Netherlands 1960  1968  1987  1993  1999 
United Kingdom  1973 1973  1987  1993  Not  member 
Denmark 1973  1973  1987  1993  Not  member 
Ireland 1973  1973  1987  1993  1999 
Greece  1981 1981  1987  1993  2001 
Portugal 1986  1986  1987  1993  1999 
Spain 1986  1986  1987  1993  1999 
Austria 1995  1995  1995  1995  1999 
Finland 1995  1995  1995  1995  1999 
Sweden 1995  1995  1995  1995  Not  member 
Note: The first year the integration dummies receive the value of 1, which they continue to receive after 
this year 
                                                 
6 Miller & Upadhyay (2002) find more evidence of convergence of total factor productivity than of real GDP per 
labour force. 
7 The data for the EU-15 countries are mostly from the Economic Outlook database by the OECD. This database 
is also available for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. For the Baltic countries and Slovenia 
we have mainly used the World Development Indicators database by the World Bank. The data for the exports of 
goods and services to GDP ratio are from the International Financial Statistics by the IMF. 8 | VILLE KAITILA 
A clear problem with our EU dummies is that in reality integration takes place over a longer 
period of time with tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions decreasing over a period of 
transition that lasts several years. For example, the formation of the EEC in 1958 initiated annual 
cuts in tariffs and quotas for non-agricultural goods among the six original member countries. 
Quotas were removed in steps between 1959 and 1962, while it took until 1968 before all the 
tariffs had been removed (see e.g. Ben-David, 1993). 
The internal market removed restrictions from the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital. The first main treaty revision, the Single European Act, only was signed in 1987. This 
started a movement towards further integration. Still, the internal market officially started in 1993, 
although it was not ‘perfect’ even in 2002. Further, we do not have dummies for free trade 
between the EU and EFTA countries. As such, dummy variables can hardly depict the complexity 
of the integration process in its whole. 
Before estimating the actual model, we explore to what extent the dummy variables alone succeed 
in explaining growth, investment and trade. Table 2 shows the results for unconditional 
convergence with the inclusion of the integration dummies, but without the other variables 
referred to in section 4 (e.g. investment or public consumption). 
Table 2. Explaining the growth rate of GDP per labour force in the EU-15 with the integration 
dummies  
Dependent variable: Change in the log of GDP per labour force 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic     Prob.  
Log of GDP per labour force (-1)  -0.0633
*** 0.0045 -14.1320 0.0000 
Dummies          
- EU member  -0.0056
* 0.0033 -1.7233 0.0854 
- Member of the customs union  0.0072
** 0.0028 2.5235 0.0119 
- Member of the internal market  0.0103
*** 0.0023 4.4255 0.0000 
- Sign. of the Maastricht Treaty  0.0046
** 0.0023 1.9934 0.0467 
- Member of EMU  0.0012  0.0024 0.4884 0.6254 
Weighted statistics   
  R-squared  0.4055 Mean dependent var.  0.0302 
  Adjusted R-squared  0.3857 S.D. dependent var.  0.0306 
  S.E. of regression  0.0240 Sum squared resid.  0.3278 
  Log likelihood  1444.4470 F-statistic  20.3938 
  Durbin-Watson stat.  1.6153 Prob. (F-statistic)  0.0000 
  F-Statistics Normalised  restriction  (=0) 
 Value  Prob. Value Std.  error 
Wald test for integration dummies  25.0689
*** 0.0000 0.0177 0.0035 
Notes: 
* = significant at 10%; 
** = significant at 5%; 
*** = significant at 1%. The time trend was not 
statistically significant and therefore it was omitted. 
The results indicate that conditional convergence has taken place in the EU-15 area when the 
integration dummies are controlled for. Also, four out of the five integration dummies are 
statistically significant. We also performed a Wald coefficient-restriction test for the five INTEGRATION AND CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE ENLARGED EU AREA | 9 
 
integration dummies.
8 The null hypothesis is that integration has had no impact on growth. The 
Wald test is thus rejected and we conclude that integration has had a statistically significant and 
positive impact on the growth of GDP per labour force. 
Integration may affect economic growth and convergence through different channels. Next, we 
analyse two possible channels using the same method: investment and exports. Integration is 
expected to have a positive effect on both per se, and through these channels it should also affect 
economic growth. 
Table 3 shows the results for investment. The dependent variable is the log of the total-
investment-to-GDP ratio. The explicatory variables are the lagged change in the log of GDP per 
labour force and the lagged dependent variable, in addition to the integration dummies. The 
coefficients for the growth rate of GDP per labour force and the investment-to-GDP ratio are 
positive and very significant. The time trend is slightly negative and statistically significant. The 
Wald test is rejected and we conclude that integration has had a statistically significant and 
positive impact on investment. 
Table 3. Explaining investment with the integration dummies (EU-15) 
Dependent variable: Log of total investment per GDP 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic             Prob. 
Change in the log of GDP per 
labour force (-1) 
0.5676
*** 0.0969 5.8551 0.0000 
Investment-to GDP ratio (-1)  0.8536
*** 0.0171 49.7881 0.0000 
Time trend  -0.0009
*** 0.0003 -2.7910 0.0054 
Dummies      
- EU member  0.0104  0.0074 1.4051  0.1605 
- Member of the customs union 
(1968) 
-0.0082 0.0061 -1.3476 
0.1783 
- Member of the internal market 
(1987) 
0.0260
*** 0.0056 4.6265 
0.0000 
- Signatory of the Maastricht Treaty 
(1993) 
-0.0024 0.0049 -0.4801 
0.6314 
- Member of the EMU  0.0053  0.0053 0.9962  0.3196 
Weighted statistics   
  R-squared  0.9946 Mean dependent var.  -1.8311 
  Adjusted R-squared  0.9944 S.D. dependent var.  0.6457 
  S.E. of regression  0.0482 Sum squared resid.  1.2820 
  Log likelihood  1002.2240 F-statistic  4872.4840 
  Durbin-Watson stat.  1.6730 Prob. (F-statistic)  0.0000 
  F-Statistics Normalised  restriction  (=0)
 Value  Prob. Value  Std.  error
Wald test for integration dummies  8.6119
*** 0.0035 0.0311 0.0106
Notes: 
*** = significant at 1%. 
                                                 
8 The dummies are for membership of the EU, customs union, internal market, the EMU and a signatory of the 
Maastricht Treaty. The null hypothesis is then c(EU)+c(CU)+c(IM)+c(MT)+c(EMU)=0, i.e. whether the five 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 10 | VILLE KAITILA 
Exports are likely to increase as a result of integration, and increased trade may also contribute 
positively to economic growth. Table 4 shows the results with the log of exports-to-GDP ratio as 
the dependent variable and the integration dummies as explanatory variables together with the 
lagged dependent variable. All but membership in the EU and the EMU are significant at least at 
the 1% level of significance. The internal market, however, had a negative impact on the exports-
to-GDP ratio. The Wald test was rejected and we conclude that integration has had a statistically 
significant and positive impact on exports. The time trend was significant and positive. 
Table 4. Explaining exports with the integration dummies (EU-15) 
Dependent variable: Log of exports-to-GDP ratio 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t-Statistic          Prob. 
Log of exports-to-GDP ratio (-1)  0.8567
*** 0.0214 40.0025 0.0000 
Time trend  0.0019
*** 0.0006 3.4115 0.0007 
Dummies      
- EU member  -0.0101  0.0098  -1.0257 0.3055 
- Member of the customs union  0.0453
*** 0.0091 4.9966 0.0000 
- Member of the internal market  -0.0354
*** 0.0097 -3.6366 0.0003 
- Sign. of the Maastricht Treaty  0.0323
*** 0.0085 3.8046 0.0002 
- Member of the EMU  0.0059  0.0106  0.5575 0.5774 
Weighted statistics        
  R-squared  0.9847  Mean dependent var.  -1.6622 
  Adjusted R-squared  0.9842  S.D. dependent var.  0.5663 
  S.E. of regression  0.0713  Sum squared resid.  2.8819 
  Log likelihood  770.3363  F-statistic  1823.5800 
  Durbin-Watson stat.  1.7962  Prob. (F-statistic)  0.0000 
   F-Statistics  Normalised  restriction  (=0)
   Value  Prob. Value Std.  error 
Wald test for integration dummies  4.8888
**  0.0274 0.0380 0.0172
Note: 
*** = significant at 1%. 
It should be noted that the dependent variable is the total exports of goods and services, not just 
exports to other EU countries. Also we do not take into consideration other forms of integration 
such as the EFTA or global tariff-cutting in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade or periods of transition in the liberalisation of trade. 
Along with the integration dummies, other dummy variables included are ‘unified Germany’ 
given for Germany in 1991-2002 and ‘time period 1960-72’, i.e. before the first oil crisis when 
productivity growth in Europe was considerably higher than after the oil crisis. We expect the 
former to have a negative sign and the latter a positive sign. 
5.  Estimation results: Conditional convergence in the EU-15 
Returning to our full model, our estimation results for growth and conditional convergence in the 
EU-15 countries in 1960-2002 are shown in Table 5. The signs of the coefficients are mostly as 
expected. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is always significant and negative 
indicating conditional convergence. The investment rate (including both private and public) is 
always significant and positive and the growth rate of the labour force is always significant and 
negative. We did not separate public investment from private investment because of lack of data. INTEGRATION AND CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE ENLARGED EU AREA | 11 
 
Table 5. Estimation results for conditional convergence of the EU-15 countries 
Dependent variable: Change in the log of GDP per labour force 
Variable Specification 
 Basic 
specifica-
tion 
With 
public 
spending
With 
inflation 
With 
public 
spending, 
inflation 
With 
openness 
indicator
With 
openness 
indicator, 
w/o EU 
dummies 
With 
public 
spending, 
inflation, 
openness 
With 
public 
spending, 
inflation, 
openness, 
w/o EU 
dummies
Basic explanatory 
variables 
    
- Log of GDP per labour 
force (-1) 
0.0304
*** 
(-4.2336) 
0.0158
*** 
(-2.7555) 
0.0341
*** 
(-7.6625) 
0.0196
*** 
(-3.4718) 
0.0279
*** 
(-3.7493) 
0.0221
*** 
(-4.1199) 
0.0250
*** 
(-4.3331) 
-.0271
*** 
(-5.2440) 
- Log of total investment 
per GDP 
0.0225
*** 
(3.1241) 
0.0274
*** 
(4.1751) 
0.0212
*** 
(3.2337) 
0.0250
*** 
(3.9381) 
0.0225
*** 
(3.2176) 
0.0219
*** 
(3.1739) 
0.0269
*** 
(4.1769) 
0.0268
*** 
(4.1550) 
- % growth rate of labour 
force 
-0.0068
*** 
(-9.9834) 
-0.0070
*** 
(-9.0281) 
-0.0063
*** 
(-12.3722) 
-0.0062
*** 
(-10.8083) 
-0.0068
*** 
(-10.0844) 
0.0068
*** 
(-9.7235) 
-0.0064
*** 
(-10.6705) 
-0.0060
*** 
(-8.9706) 
Other explanatory 
variables 
             
- Log of public 
consumption (% of GDP)
.. -0.0256
*** 
(-4.4919) 
.. -0.0278
*** 
(-4.7356) 
.. ..  -0.0307
*** 
(-4.6420) 
-0.0274
*** 
(-4.3462) 
- Consumer price inflation 
(%) 
.. ..  -0.1663
*** 
(-6.2080) 
-0.1367
*** 
(-5.3405) 
.. ..  -0.1350
*** 
(-5.6327) 
-0.1149
*** 
(-5.2508) 
- Standard deviation in 
CPI, 3-year centred 
.. ..  0.0479 
(0.4609) 
-0.0006 
(-0.0065) 
.. ..  0.0413 
(0.4468) 
0.0843 
(0.9620) 
- Log of exports (% of 
GDP) 
.. .. .. ..  0.0066 
(1.2525) 
0.0073 
(1.4362) 
0.0097 
(1.6353) 
0.0092 
(1.6232) 
Dummy variables                
- EU member  -0.0053
* 
(-1.7423) 
insign. insign. insign. insign.  ..  insign.  .. 
- Member of the customs 
union (1968) 
0.0093
*** 
(3.7214) 
0.0055
*** 
(2.9469) 
0.0065
*** 
(3.0435) 
0.0068
*** 
(3.2580) 
0.0046
** 
(2.4258) 
.. 0.0044
** 
(2.1456) 
.. 
- Member of the internal 
market (1987) 
0.0041
** 
(2.0819) 
insign. -0.0060
*** 
(-2.8705) 
-0.0070
*** 
(-3.5588) 
0.0040
** 
(2.3220) 
.. insign.  .. 
- Signatory of the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) 
insign. insign. insign. insign. -0.0030
* 
(-1.8542) 
.. 0.0064
*** 
(-3.7980) 
.. 
- Member of the EMU  insign.  insign.  insign.  insign.  insign. .. insign.  .. 
- Unified Germany  -0.0058
* 
(-1.7646) 
insign. insign. insign. insign. insign. insign. -0.0069
** 
(-2.1539) 
- 1960-72  0.0101
*** 
(3.4010) 
0.0067
*** 
(2.6940) 
insign. insign.  0.0117
*** 
(4.0589) 
0.0114
*** 
(4.5067) 
insign. insign. 
Weighted  statistics              
  R-squared  0.6035  0.6605  0.6520 0.7132 0.6399  0.6371 0.7352 0.7269 
  Adjusted R-squared  0.5664  0.6201 0.5988 0.6590 0.5954 0.5946  0.6750  0.6657 
  Durbin-Watson stat  1.8616  1.8821 1.8274 1.9156 1.8487 1.8452  1.8738  1.8725 
  F-statistic  16.2739  16.3320  12.2520 13.1713 14.3861  15.0082 12.2296 11.8648 
  Prob. (F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.00000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 
* = significant at 10%; 
** = significant at 5%; 
*** = significant at 1%; 
insign. = statistically not significant; .. = not included in the specification. 12 | VILLE KAITILA 
When included in the specifications, public consumption is significant and it has a negative 
impact on growth. Barro (1991) also found that public consumption has a negative effect on 
growth. He did not, however, find this negative effect arising from public investment, which was 
neutral from the point of view of growth. Public consumption may introduce distortions, such as 
high tax rates, without providing stimuli for growth and investment. 
Higher inflation rates proved to be bad for growth while, in this respect, their volatility has been 
insignificant in the EU-15 area. For example, in his study of developing countries, Fischer (1993) 
shows that inflation is harmful for growth as it reduces investment and productivity growth. A 
stable macroeconomic framework is a necessary but still not a sufficient condition for sustainable 
economic growth. The coefficient for trade was positive but it did not become significant even 
when the integration dummies were dropped from the estimations. 
The dummy variables for integration were also as usually expected. Membership of the customs 
union proved to be the most important factor in this respect, contributing positively to growth. On 
the other hand, the formation of the internal market had an ambiguous effect. In summary, this 
does not amount to very substantial evidence on behalf of the benefits of EU integration from the 
point of view of conditional convergence. Indeed, we have already expressed some criticism of 
the structure of the integration dummies used here. 
As expected, the reunification of Germany had a negative effect on growth in two specifications. 
In addition, the dummy for the years before the first oil crisis is positive in four specifications. 
Otherwise these dummies were insignificant. The EU and EMU dummies did not become positive 
or significant in the estimations. We also tried to use a dummy variable for the recipients of 
cohesion funds, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in 1988-2002, but its coefficient was not 
statistically significant. Ederveen et al. (2002) provide evidence that on average, structural funds 
are ineffective in view of boosting growth, after controlling for openness, institutional quality, 
corruption and indicators of good governance. Nevertheless, if the institutional setting is good, 
structural funds do enhance growth. This is important given that corruption is a major problem in 
many of the new member countries and they are beneficiaries of structural funds. 
The dummy variables comprise (see also Table 1): EU (=1 if EU member), the customs union 
(1968 onward if an EU member), the internal market (1987 onward if an EU member), the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993 onward if an EU member), the EMU (=1 if an EMU member), unified 
Germany (1991 onwards for Germany) and 1960-72 (for all countries). 
We further do Wald coefficient-restriction tests for the five integration dummies
9 to test whether 
they are significant when taken together (Table 6).  
Table 6. Wald coefficient-restriction tests for the five integration dummies taken together (EU-15) 
Specification  F-Statistic  Normalised restriction (= 0) 
 Value  Probability  Value  Std.  error 
Basic specification  8.7575
***  0.0032 0.01029  0.00348 
With public spending  4.8844
**  0.0275 0.00697  0.00315 
With inflation  0.0417  0.8383  0.00070  0.00345 
With public spending, inflation  0.4817  0.4880  0.00218  0.00314 
With openness indicator  3.4167
*  0.0651 0.00637  0.00345 
With public spending, inflation, 
openness 
1.7867 0.1820  0.00483 0.00361 
Notes: 
* = significant at 10%; 
** = significant at 5%; 
*** = significant at 1%. 
                                                 
9 The dummies are for membership of the customs union, the internal market, the EMU and a signatory of the 
Maastricht Treaty. The null hypothesis is c(EU)+c(CU)+c(IM)+c(MT)+c(EMU)=0, i.e. whether the five 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The dummies for unified Germany and pre-1973 have been included in the 
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The null hypothesis is that integration has had no impact on growth. The results are mixed. When 
inflation is not included in the specification, the results indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected 
and that integration has had a statistically significant effect on growth. But whenever inflation is 
included, the null hypothesis is not rejected and integration has not been statistically significant. 
6.  Estimation results: Convergence of the CEECs 
Next we use PMG to estimate the speed of convergence of the CEECs towards the average GDP 
per labour force in the EU-15 countries in 1993-2002. The results are shown in Table 7. On the 
right-hand side, we have a catching-up variable that is given by the ratio of GDP per labour force 
in each CEEC to the average GDP per labour force in the EU-15 countries. 
Table 7. Estimation results for the growth rate of GDP per labour force in the CEECs 
Dependent variable: Change in the log of GDP per labour force 
Variable Specification 
  Basic 
specification 
With public 
spending 
With 
inflation 
Explanatory variables      
- Log of GDP per labour force (-1), EU-15 = 100 -0.1758
*** 
(-6.3027) 
-0.6252
*** 
(-14.6080) 
-0.1742
** 
(-2.4910) 
- Log of total investment per GDP  0.0507
*** 
(2.9517) 
0.1619
*** 
(5.3390) 
-0.0534
*** 
(-3.0429) 
- % growth rate of the labour force  -0.0030
* 
(-1.9613) 
-0.0031
* 
(-2.3519) 
-0.0038 
(-1.3439) 
- Log of public consumption (% of GDP)  ..  -0.2848
*** 
(-9.7811) 
.. 
- Consumer price inflation (%)  ..  ..  -0.1205 
(-1.5984) 
- Standard deviation in CPI, three-year centred  ..  ..  -0.3274 
(-1.5284) 
- Dummy for Europe Agreements  0.0119
*** 
(5.5169) 
0.0208
*** 
(8.2035) 
insign. 
Weighted statistics      
  R-squared  0.9172  0.9948  0.9516 
  Adjusted R-squared  0.8551  0.9711  0.8394 
  Durbin-Watson stat.  2.3975  2.3854  2.5140 
  F-statistic  14.7704  42.1399  8.4836 
  Prob. (F-statistic)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; 
* = significant at 10%; 
** = significant at 5%; 
*** = significant at 
1%; insign. = statistically not significant; .. = not included in the specification. 
The number of different specifications is smaller than in Table 5. In more complicated 
specifications the data did not perform well: there were either too few observations or 
convergence did not occur and the Durbin-Watson statistics became very large. With the simplest 
specification (and with either public consumption or inflation included), the results were more 
reasonable and these results are reported below. 14 | VILLE KAITILA 
The coefficient for the catching-up term is negative and statistically significant, implying 
conditional convergence of the eight CEECs towards the average of the EU-15 countries. This 
means that labour productivity has increased faster in the former than in the latter after controlling 
for investment rates, the growth of the labour force and a dummy variable for the Europe 
Agreements.
10 These other explanatory variables also prove to be significant and of the expected 
sign, i.e. investment has had a positive effect on growth, an increase in the labour force has had a 
negative effect and the Europe Agreements have had a positive effect. 
As for the two other specifications, public consumption has had a significant negative effect on 
growth; inflation and its volatility did not become statistically significant. They were both 
significant at 15%, however, and their signs were as expected. Removing the standard deviation of 
inflation had the effect that all other variables – including inflation – became very significant and 
of the expected sign. 
Wagner & Hlouskova (2002) argued on the basis of data going up to 1998 that the neo-classical 
growth model did “not yet adequately describe the growth process” in the CEECs. Nevertheless, 
even with some obvious deficiencies, we may conclude on the basis of the results presented in 
Table 7 that it seems the growth model has begun to work for the CEECs. Still, owing to the 
limited number of years available, it does not work as well as for the EU-15 countries and the 
number of specifications that we were able to use was smaller. 
Conclusions 
The CEECs are less wealthy than the EU-15 countries. As predicted by the basic convergence 
theory, GDP growth rates have been higher in the former than in the latter after the end of the 
initial decline in their GDP in the early phase of economic transition. Prospective EU membership 
has accelerated much-needed changes in administration, legislation, etc., and it has also led to an 
increase in trade and inflows of foreign direct investment, which have introduced more modern 
technology and business practices. 
In this paper, we first analysed the conditional convergence of GDP per labour force within the 
EU-15 area in 1960-2002 using a pooled mean-group estimator, which allows for heterogeneity in 
the short-term coefficients, but assumes homogeneity in the long-term ones. Then we made a 
similar analysis of the CEECs’ conditional convergence towards the EU-15 average in 1993-2002. 
The signs of the coefficients of the explicatory variables in our estimation results for the EU-15 
countries are mostly as expected. Conditional convergence has taken place and growth in GDP per 
labour force has been affected positively by investment (including both private and public 
investment) and negatively by the growth rate of the labour force. 
Public consumption is statistically significant and has had a negative impact on growth. Public 
consumption may introduce distortions, such as high tax rates, without providing stimuli for 
growth and investment. A higher inflation rate proved to be statistically significant and bad for 
growth, while the volatility of inflation has not been statistically significant. The effect from 
openness (the exports-to-GDP ratio) was positive but it did not become statistically significant 
even when integration dummies were omitted from the estimation. The integration dummies were 
shown to explain openness to a large degree. 
The signs of the dummy variables for integration were also as usually expected. Membership in 
the customs union proved to be the most important factor in this respect, contributing positively to 
growth. On the other hand, the formation of the internal market has had an ambiguous effect. 
Wald tests for the combined effect of the integration dummies indicated that integration has 
                                                 
10 For our purposes, the Europe Agreements entered into force in 1993 in Hungary and Poland, in 1995 in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, in 1997 in Slovenia and in 1998 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. There were, 
however, some free trade arrangements already in force before these dates. INTEGRATION AND CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE ENLARGED EU AREA | 15 
 
positively affected the growth rate of GDP per labour force as well as investment and total 
exports. Yet when inflation was included in the specifications, the Wald tests were not rejected 
and the integration dummies failed to have explicatory power. The evidence is therefore mixed in 
this regard. The way the integration dummies have been constructed here has failed to take into 
account transition periods from one phase of integration to the next. 
We then used the same method to estimate the growth rate of GDP per labour force in the CEECs. 
The number of observations was relatively small and thus we refrained from performing the more 
complicated specifications. Still, conditional convergence towards the EU-15 was shown to have 
occurred. Investment has had a positive effect and public consumption has had a negative effect 
on growth. Inflation failed to become statistically significant although it was negative at the 15% 
level of significance. When inflation volatility was removed from the specification, the negative 
effect from inflation became statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. 
The investment-to-GDP ratio in the new member states has been relatively high, although at least 
temporarily past its peak, which was reached in 1998. High investment rates will support growth 
in the CEECs. The demographic growth rates will not support growth in the long term; however, 
as birth rates have been quite low since transition began. 
Total public expenditure is almost at the same level in the CEECs as in the EU-15 countries on 
average. Even though the CEECs have been lowering their tax rates, especially corporate tax 
rates, these countries have relatively large public sectors and are running quite large fiscal 
deficits. This may limit their growth potential in the future. The Baltic countries and Slovenia are 
better positioned in this respect. 
The pooled mean-group estimation method that we used manages to explain relatively well the 
conditional convergence in GDP per labour force in the EU-15 area in 1960-2002. It also partially 
succeeds in extending the same analysis to the eight transition countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe that joined the EU in 2004. The more complicated specifications do not work to the same 
degree with the CEECs. Still, it is becoming possible to explain the convergence of the CEECs in 
terms of the neo-classical growth theory.  
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